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2
SHOULD THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
VICTIMS AND CRIMINALS COUNT?:
PAYNE V TENNESSEE AND TWO VIEWS
OF EFFICIENT PUNISHMENT
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN *
The purpose of this Article is to investigate two interrelated issues.
One is the question of how to use economic theory to construct an
efficient set of criminal punishments. I will argue that a simple rule—
set expected punishment equal to the damage done by the crime—
provides a useful first approximation, but only a first approximation,
to the correct answer.' The other question is how, if at all, punishment
should be affected by the characteristics of criminal and victim. In
answering that question, I hope to demonstrate both the usefulness
and the limitations of the simple version of the economic theory of
punishment, and the simple rule it implies, for dealing with several of
the issues raised in a recent and controversial Supreme Court case—
Payne v. Tennessee. 2
Part I of the Article attempts to work out the economics of efficient
punishment. Part II applies the analysis to the question of whether
punishment ought to be affected by characteristics of the criminal—
whether, for example, rich criminals should pay larger fines than poor
criminals for the same crimes. Part III applies the analysis to the
parallel question raised in Payne—whether punishment ought to be
affected by characteristics of the victim. Part IV expands, from an
economic viewpoint, on one issue raised by Payne—the possibility of
varying punishment according to consequences, in order to selectively
deter criminals who have some but not perfect knowledge of what the
consequence of their crime will be. Part V considers a constitutional
*John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School, I would like
to thank Gary Becker, David Emmanuel, Wendy Gordon, William Landes, James Lindgren, Larry
Lessig, Tracey Maclin and Richard Posner for useful comments and suggestions.
I Expected punishment is probability of punishment times amount. of punishment. If offend-
ers face a .1 probability of having to pay a $1000 line, their expected punishment is .1 X $1000
= $100. If there are several different possible punishments for the same offense, then the
expected punishment is probability times punishment summed over all the punishments, Thus
if offenders thee a .1 probability of a $1000 fine and a .2 probability of a $100 fine, their expected
punishment is .1 x $1000 + .2 X $100 = $120.
2 1 1 1 S. Ct. 2597 (1989).
731
732	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:731
issue raised by Payne and by the analysis of this Article—whether
making punishment depend on the characteristics of the victim vio-
lates the requirement of equal protection, applied not to criminals but
to victims. Part VI considers a problem in moral philosophy raised by
Payne and this Article—whether it is just to make punishment depend
on consequences of the crime that the criminal may not have antici-
pated.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF EFFICIENT PUNISHMENT
A legal system may be evaluated in a variety of ways by economists,
legal scholars or moral philosophers. Through most of this Article,
however, I shall assume that it has only one purpose: economic
efficiency.' I view a legal system as a set of rules designed to affect
behavior. A change in legal rules is an improvement if the summed
benefits to those affected, measured by their money equivalent, is
larger than the summed losses, where the money equivalent of a
benefit or loss is the largest sum the affected party would pay to receive
the benefit or avoid the loss.
Seen from this perspective, what is wrong with crimes is that they
occur even if they are inefficient. My willingness to buy a television set
demonstrates that it is worth more to me than to its present owner, so
a voluntary sale is an improvement and should be permitted. But I may
be willing to steal a television set even if it is worth much less to me
than to its present owner. Thus, inefficient theft may occur, and should
be prevented.'
It seems to follow from this argument that we want to prevent only
inefficient theft. If my stealing your television set produced a net
benefit, even after allowing for associated costs (my time burgling, your
expenses on burglar alarms), then changing the legal system to permit
me to steal it would be an improvement.5
3
 This is the same objective that Richard Posner describes as "wealth maximization." RICHARD
A. POSHER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-16 (1990). See DAvin FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN
INTERMEDIATE TEXT 434-51 (2d ed, 1990), for a more detailed discussion of what it means and
why it might be a desirable objective.
4
 One reason the television set is worth less to me may be that its value is net of the cost to
me of stealing it—burglar's tools, time and effort spent breaking into a house, and the like.
Economic analysis of the market for theft implies that marginal thieves get no net benefit; the
cost to them of being thieves equals the value to them of what they steal, so the cost to their
victims is a net loss with no benefit to balance it. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 565-69.
5 This particular example is an implausible one. If your television set is worth more to me,
there is no need for me to steal it; I can buy it instead. My gain fruits stealing it is only the money
I save by not buying it from you. But that is equal to your loss, so after including the associated
costs the theft is inefficient. It follows that if a crime is simply an involuntary substitute for a
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One way of doing so is to set the expected punishment equal to
the damage done. Criminals will commit crimes only if the value to
them is greater than their expected punishment, hence greater than
the damage, so efficient crimes and only efficient crimes will prove
worth committing. Many discussions of efficient punishment argue
either that this is what our legal system does or that it is what it should
do.6
According to this view, a punishment for a crime' is simply a
Pigouvian tax; like an emission fee for pollution, it forces actors to bear
the cost of their actions. If a criminal commits a crime even though he
knows that he will suffer an expected punishment equal to the damage
done by his crime, that demonstrates that his benefit is greater than
his victim's loss; the crime is efficient and ought not to be deterred."
If this is right, the optimal expected punishment is simply equal
to the damage done. All potential offenders whose benefit from com-
mitting the offense is less than the damage done will be deterred; they
will face a punishment greater than their benefit, making the net
return from the offense (benefit minus punishment) a loss. Potential
offenders for whom the benefit is greater than the damage done will
voluntary transaction, we would never expect it to be efficient. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at
569-73; POSNER, supra note 3, at 14-16,206-11,220-22.
There are, however, involuntary transactions that have no voluntary substitute. Many are
things we usually classify as torts, but some are crimes. If, for instance, I drive home after having
two glasses of beer, I save myself a taxi fare but impose a cost, in possible death or injury, on
every driver, rider and pedestrian along my route. Even if the savings to me is larger than the
cost to them, there are severe transactional problems with trying to get all of them to agree to
allow me to drive. Or consider an efficient assault. One can imagine a situation where one person
is angry enough to attack another despite knowing that the resulting punishment will be a fine
equal to the full damage done. A more exotic example would be efficient theft,--by someone who
enjoyed the excitement enough to more than make up for the associated costs. See PosNER, supra
note 3, at 218.
6 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 217-67. Posner suggests that expected punishment should be
slightly above damage done to deter inefficient crimes and force criminals whose crimes would
be efficient to substitute still more efficient market transactions, while permitting efficient crimes
for which no good market substitute exists. Id.
?The analysis applies to civil damages as well as to criminal penalties. See David Friedman,
An Economic. Explanation of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (1989). The same
analysis could also be applied to administrative penalties and to sanctions used by a firm to control
the behavior of its employees.
tThroughout my analysis, I assume that costs and benefits to criminals count, in social
welfare calculations, just like costs and benefits to anyone else. This assumption has been ques-
tioned by a few scholars in the law and economics field, most notably George Stigler and Gordon
Tullock, who suggest that benefits to criminals ought to be given no weight in such calculations.
GORDON TULLOCK, TUE LOGIC OF THE Law 243 (1971); George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement
of Laws, J. Pot. ECON. 526,529 (1970). My reasons for rejecting this position are discussed in
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 1128-19.
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face a punishment less than their benefit, making the offense a net
gain. Hence they will commit it. Inefficient offenses are deterred,
efficient offenses are not deterred, and so we have the efficient out-
come.
If we are talking about speeding tickets, this sounds plausible
enough. Presumably one reason we do not confiscate the cars of
convicted speeders is that might be too effective a punishment. We are
not sure we want everyone always to keep to the speed limit. When
applied to offenses such as rape or murder, however, the efficient crime
paradigm of enforcement strikes many legal scholars, especially those
who are not economists, as both unrelated to the real legal system and
morally bizarre. It implies, among other things, that the reason we do
not impose stiffer penalties on convicted murderers is that we are
afraid of having too few murders. 9 It also seems to imply that the
optimal punishment for murder is an increasing function of the value
of the victim—an issue that was central to the recent Supreme Court
case of Payne v. Tennessee.'°
A. The Inefficiency of Preventing All and Only Inefficient Crimes
The argument given above for setting expected punishment equal
to damage done is wrong. The reason it is wrong is that it ignores the
cost of preventing crime." In order to impose a given expected pun-
ishment, we must catch some fraction of offenders and punish them.
Both activities are costly. Typically, the cost per offense increases with
both probability of apprehension and severity of punishment. 12
It is obvious why the cost per offense increases with probability of
apprehension. It takes more police to catch fifty murderers out of a
hundred than to catch only twenty-five, and it takes more prosecutors
and court time to convict them. To see why it also increases with the
This point, and to some extent this Article, were suggested to me by discussions with
Stephen Schulholer, themselves arising out of a correspondence between Stephen Schulhofer
and John Lou.
1 '3 111 S, Ct. 2597 (1989),
11 1 ant ignoring in this essay two other problems with the argument. The probability of
apprehension, and hence the expected punishment, is different for different criminals, so even
if we wanted to prevent inefficient and only inefficient crimes, there is no pattern of enforcement
that would do so. In addition, some punishments, such as imprisonment or execution, not only
provide an incentive not to commit a crime but also make it more difficult to commit further
crimes. I am considering only deterrence, not incapacitation.
12 This argument appears in David Friedman, Reflections on Optimal Punishment or Should
the Rich Pay Higher Fines?, 3 lIrs. IN LAW AND ECON. 185 (1981). For a more recent discussion,
see Friedman, supra note 7, at 1125-26. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988).
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severity of the punishment, it is worth thinking about what, from an
economic standpoint, the cost of punishment means.
Suppose the punishment for an offense simply consists of the
convicted offender paying a thousand dollar fine to the state. The cost
to the criminal, which is what gives the punishment its deterrent effect,
is a thousand dollars. But the net cost, what economists call "social
cost," is zero. Every dollar the criminal loses the state collects. In this
case, punishment cost, defined as the difference between the cost the
punishment imposes on the criminal and the benefit it provides to
others," is zero.
What if a criminal cannot pay a fine high enough to provide the
amount of deterrence we want to impose? In that case, instead of (or
addition to) fining him, we imprison him—say for a year. Suppose a
year's imprisonment is equivalent, from the criminal's standpoint, to
a ten thousand dollar fine." The cosi the punishment imposes on them
each is ten thousand dollars, but the enforcement system receives none
of that. Instead, the enforcement system must spend money—say an-
other ten thousand dollars—to pay the cost of the imprisonment. So
the net cost of the punishment, the criminal's loss plus the enforce-
ment system's loss, is twenty thousand dollars.
As we increase the size of the punishment we wish to impose, the
number of offenders who can pay it as a fine decreases, forcing us to
shift to more costly punishments such as imprisonment. So increasing
13 The benefit considered here is the direct benefit of the punishment—a line received by
the state, tort damages received by the victim in a civil case, the cost of running a prison (a
negative benefit) or the like. It does not include the deterrent effect of the punishment, which
is considered separately in the analysis. It does include benefits or costs that the victim, or others,
receive from knowing that the punishment has been imposed. The death penalty might be a very
inefficient punishment if many people in the society were made unhappy by the knowledge that
a criminal had been executed.
Deterrence depends on expected punishment, but punishment cost per unit of punishment
typically depends on the actual punishment employed. This is probably true of costs such as
public disapproval as well as costs such as maintaining a prison. While economic theory focuses
on the appropriate expected punishment for a given crime, the public, observing punishment but
not probability, may well judge the system by the relation of the actual punishment to the crime.
Ifs°, then one effect of the victim impact statements discussed below may he to raise the perceived
wickedness of the crime in the eyes of the jury, and thus raise the ceiling on the maximum
punishment the jury is willing to impose. The effect is the same as if the jury were adjusting
expected punishment—probability times actual punishment—in response to an increase in its
perception of the damage done by the offense, because in either case the probability of imposing
the death penalty rises, but the reason for the effect is different. this point was suggested to me
by James Lindgren.
14 When I say that one punishment is equivalent to another, I mean that they have the same
deterrent effect. From the standpoint of utility theory, this is equivalent to saying that both
punishments have the same disutility for the offender.
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the severity of the punishment typically increases the punishment cost
per offense punished. 15
It is inefficient for me to steal a television set that is worth five
hundred dollars to you and only four hundred dollars to me. But it is
still more inefficient to prevent me from stealing the set if the cost of
doing so is two hundred dollars additional expenditure on police,
courts and prisons. The rule "prevent all inefficient offenses and only
inefficient offenses" is correct only if doing so is costless. The economi-
cally correct rule is to prevent an offense if and only if the net cost
from the offense occurring is greater than the cost of preventing it. It
follows that if there is a positive cost to preventing an offense, an
efficient legal system will let some inefficient offenses occur.
We now have an answer to one of the criticisms of the economic
approach. The reason we do not increase the punishment for murder
need not be that we are afraid we would then have too few murders.
It may be, and probably is, that although we would like to prevent more
murders than we do prevent (indeed, we might like to prevent all
murders), the cost of doing so is more than we are willing to pay. 16
The cost of preventing an offense may sometimes be negative.
While cost per offense rises with increases in expected punishment,
the number of offenses decreases, because the higher expected pun-
ishment deters some offenses that would otherwise have been commit-
ted. The fewer offenses that occur, the less must be spent to apprehend
and punish offenders. If this second effect outweighs the increase in
cost per offense, then raising the expected punishment lowers the total
enforcement and punishment cost—a system with higher punishments
(and fewer offenses) costs less than a system with lower punishments
(and more offenses). In such a situation, the additional cost of deter-
ring one more offense is negative, so it is efficient to prevent not only
all inefficient offenses but some efficient ones as well. In the extreme,
one could imagine a society where the penalty for shoplifting was
death, with the result that there were no shoplifters and nobody ever
had to be caught, convicted and executed.
As a less extreme example of a situation where the cost of prevent-
ing an offense is negative, consider an offense with the following
characteristics:
15 A inure rigorous form of the argument appears in Friedman, supra note 12, at 198.
16 While my discussion will focus on direct costs of enforcement and punishment, one should
also include costs such as the possibility that more severe enforcement will result in more innocent
parties being convicted, or that increases in governmental powers designed to catch more
criminals may be used in other and less desirable ways.
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Cost to victim: $1000 per offense
Cost per offense (enforcement plus punishment costs) of
imposing an expected punishment of P:P/2
Number of offenses if P = $1000: 100/year
Number of offenses if P = $1100: 50/year
To simplify the exposition, let the probability of conviction be one,
making expected punishment P equal to actual punishment.
We begin with a penalty of $1000; a hundred offenses are occur-
ring each year. They are all efficient offenses; the fact that they are
committed despite the penalty means that the offenders are getting
more than $1000 by committing them, so the offenders gain more than
the victims lose. If we raise the penalty to $1100 we will deter fifty
efficient offenses a year. Each would have harmed the victim by $1000
and benefited the criminal by something between $1000 and $1100.
We know that the benefit to the criminal is at least $1000 because he
or she still commits the offense even when the expected punishment
is $1000. We know it is no more than $1100 because the criminal does
not commit it when the expected punishment is $1100. The net gain
from each of those offenses is between zero and $100, so the loss from
deterring fifty of them is between zero and $5000. By deterring those
offenses, however, we save the cost of catching and punishing the
offenders. Imposing a $1000 punishment on 100 criminals costs us
$50,000. Imposing an $1100 punishment on 50 criminals costs $27,500.
By raising the punishment we have saved $22,500 in punishment and
enforcement cost. On net we are better off.' 7
The situation is shown by Table 1; everything except punishment
is per year. Cost to victims is $1000 (the injury per victim) times the
number of offenses. Gain to criminals is the value to them of commit-
dng the offenses. Net cost is the loss to victims plus enforcement and
punishment cost minus the gain to the criminals; our objective is to
minimize it.
17p.n even better solution would be to punish only the inefficient offenses. We would thus
avoid both the cost of punishing the efficient offenses and the inefficiency of preventing them.
But in order to know which offenses are efficient, we must somehow find out whether the
criminal's gain is more or less than the cost imposed on the victim. The way we find out, just as
on ordinary markets, is by charging a price—an expected punishment in the case of offenses—
and seeing whether the criminal is willing to pay it. In order to do that we must impose the
punishment on inefficient as well as efficient offenses.
Where there is sonic other way of identifying the efficient offenses, we can save the expense
of punishing them, One example is the excuse of necessity. The hunter who, lost in the woods
and starving, breaks into a locked cabin in order to telephone for help will not be treated like
an ordinary trespasser.
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Table 1
Number
Enforcement
and Net not
Expected of Cost to Gain to Punishment including
Punishment Offenses Victims Criminals Cost E&P Cost Net Cost
$1000 100 $100,000 X $50,000 $100,000—X $150,000—X
$1100 50 50,000 X—$52,500 27,500 102,000—X 130,000—X
Xis the total gain to the criminals if the punishment is $1000 and
100 offenses occur each year. The value of the offense to the fifty
offenders who would be deterred if we raised the punishment to $1100
is between $1000 and $1100. For simplicity, I assume it is $1050,
making the total value to the criminals of the fifty offenses equal to
$52,500. So the total gain to the criminals falls to X — $52,500 when
we raise the punishment to $1100, as shown in Table 1.
If we increase the punishment from $1000 to $1100, gain to
criminals falls by more than cost to victims, because we are deterring
efficient offenses, so net cost not including enforcement and punishment
cost is higher with the higher punishment, as shown in the next to last
column. But that is more than balanced by the drop in enforcement
and punishment costs, so net cost, the final column, is lower with the
higher punishment.
The table does not show the cost to the criminals of paying the
punishment. If included, it would appear twice, once as a cost and once
as a benefit, and so have no effect on the net cost. It is a cost to the
criminals. If the punishment is $1000, the net gain to the criminals is
only X — $100,000, because they are paying $100,000 in fines as pun-
ishment for their offense. It is a benefit to the enforcement system that
collects the fines. Punishment cost is the difference between what the
criminal pays and what the enforcement system receives. With a pun-
ishment of $1000, for example, the enforcement system receives
$100,000, $50,000 of which goes to pay the cost of catching and pun-
ishing criminals.
We have now seen an example of a situation in which it is efficient
to set an expected punishment higher than the damage done by the
offense, thus deterring some efficient offenses. Generalizing the argu-
ment, we can show that the level of expected punishment should be
set equal to the damage done by an offense only if the marginal cost
of deterring one more offense is zero. If the marginal cost of deterring
one more offense is positive, then expected punishment should be less
than damage done; offenses that are only slightly inefficient, that
injure the victim by only a little more than they benefit the criminal,
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are not worth the cost of deterring. We expect marginal cost of deter-
rence to be positive for crimes for which an increase in expected
punishment deters only a small fraction of offenses, so that we end up
with almost as many offenses as before the increase and a substantially
larger enforcement and punishment. cost per offense. Such crimes are
described, in economic terms, as in very inelastic supply.
If, on the other hand, the marginal cost of deterring one more
offense is negative, if the sum of enforcement and punishment costs
decreases as we increase the level of punishment, due to the decrease
in the number of offenses to be punished, then the level of punish-
ment should be more than the damage done. In such a situation, as
in the example of Table 1, we are willing to deter a few efficient
offenses in order to avoid the cost of punishing them. We would expect
that situation to occur for crimes for which a small increase in expected
punishment produces a large reduction in offenses—crimes in very
elastic supply. For such crimes, the large reduction in number of
offenses as we increase the punishment outweighs the increase in
enforcement and punishment cost per offense.'m
This solution to the problem of setting optimal punishments com-
bines elements of two different intuitions: punishment equal to dam-
age done and enough punishment to deter. If imposing punishment
is inexpensive, the optimum is about equal to damage done—enforce-
ment and punishment costs are unimportant, so we simply design our
system to deter all inefficient and only inefficient crimes. If the supply
of offenses is highly elastic at some particular level of punishment, so
that below that level there are many offenses and above it very few, the
optimal punishment is at the point where any further increase would
have very little deterrent effect to balance its cost—just enough pun-
ishment to deter most offenses.
B. Efficient Punishment: A Formal Treatment
The same argument can be put in a more precise mathematical
form as follows. We define:
p(b): the density of offenses per year as a function of the gain
b to the offender of committing the offense.' 9
0(P) = f;p(b)db: the number of offenses per year whose per-
petrators gain more than P by committing them. Since an
18 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 761 Pot,. EcoN, 169
(1968), for an early discussion of the effect of the elasticity of the supply function for offenses
on optimal punishment.
19 am making no assumption as to whether or not each offense is committed by a different
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offense will be committed only if the gain is at least as great
as the expected punishment, 0(P) is the number of offenses
that occur annually if the expected punishment is P.
C(F): the cost per offense of imposing an expected punish-
ment P, using the least costly combination of actual punish-
ment and probability. I assume that this does not depend on
the number of offenses.
D.. the damage done per offense. For simplicity this too is
assumed independent of the number of offenses.
We wish to find P, the expected punishment which minimizes a
social cost function:
SC(P) = 0 (P)[D + C(P)] — Jbp(b)db	
(Equation 1)
p(b)dp [D + C(P)] •
	 bp(b)db
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of crime—number
of offenses multiplied by damage per offense plus enforcement cost
(the cost of catching, convicting and punishing offenders) per
offense. The second term is the benefit of offenses to the offenders.
The integral starts at b = P because only crimes for which benefit
to the criminal is at least equal to expected punishment will be
committed.
Setting the derivative of SC(P) with regard to P equal to 0, we
have, for P equal to its optimum value P :
d[O(P)C(IS)) 	A0 = Dp(P) +	 dP	 PP(P)
p(P)[P — D] + d[°(P)C(5)]dP
Solving for the optimal punishment P we have:
offender. Because I am considering only deterrence and not incapacitation, the analysis is the
same for the case where all offenses are committed by the same criminal, the case where each
offense is by a different criminal, or anything in between.
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P = D — 1, d[0 (P) CO)] (Equation 2)
P	 dP
Equation 2 is the mathematical equivalent of the result derived in
the earlier verbal argument. 0(P) C(P) is the total cost of imposing
an expected punishment of P on Q(P) offenses. Deterring one
more offense requires an increase in P of 1/p (P) so 1/p (P) •
d[O(P) G(P)] / dP is the cost of deterring one more offense. If P of
1/p(P) so 1/p(P) • d[O(P) C(P)]/ dP > 0 at P = P, then total
enforcement cost is increasing with increasing punishment, and, as
can be seen from Equation 2, the optimal punishment is less than
the damage done. If 1/p (P) • d[O(P)C(P)]/ dP < 0 at P = P, then
total enforcement cost is decreasing with increasing punishment
(due to the decrease in the number of offenses) and the optimal
punishment is more than the damage done. 2°
C. Wrong Argument, Right Answer?
My analysis so far implies that the simple description of efficient
punishment is wrong. If our objective was economic efficiency, we
would not, even if we could, choose to punish all inefficient offenses
and only inefficient offenses.
Although this way of looking at efficient punishment is wrong, it
is also useful. It provides a simple model that can be applied to a wide
range of legal regulation of behavior. At some extremes, the model's
description is a deceptive one—as when it implies that we are con-
cerned about not deterring too many murders. But for much behav-
ior—speeding, polluting, fining for overdue library books, arguably
most of civil law—preventing inefficient behavior is a fairly good,
although somewhat oversimplified, description of our objective.
Even in cases such as murder, where the literal application of the
model may seem absurd, it still contains a considerable element of
truth. The limiting factor in how many murders we deter is not our
fear of deterring efficient murders. But, seen from the standpoint of
economic efficiency, the reason we are willing to bear substantial costs
in order to deter murder is that we believe it is (very) inefficient—that
the gain to the murderer is typically much less than the loss to the
victim.
20 The relationship between optimal expected punishment and damage done depends on
how enforcement cost changes with expected punishment at the optimum. In general, the elasticity
of the supply of offenses will be different at different values of P
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Even those who reject economic efficiency as a complete descrip-
tion of the objectives of our legal system should not reject it as a partial
description. It may well be true that we would want to deter all murders
(supposing we could do so costlessly) even if we believed that some
were, in the strict economic sense, efficient. 21
 But we would be a great
deal less concerned with deterring murders if we did not believe that
the costs of murder were large compared to the benefits.
Consider the following as evidence for that claim. There have
been several famous shipwreck cases involving murder and cannibal-
i sm .22 People who write and think about such cases find the punish-
ment of such behavior much more troubling than the punishment of
ordinary murder. That suggests that if the benefit of committing mur-
der were much higher relative to the cost, if situations where individu-
als could preserve their own lives only at the cost of someone else's
were common, we might have substantially different attitudes toward
murder.
Alternatively, imagine a society where everyone regarded life after
death—perhaps reincarnation—as a proven fact. To the members of
that society the cost imposed by murderers on their victims would seem
much lower than it does to most of us. I conjecture that in such a
society murder would be considered less serious relative to other
crimes—more nearly comparable to, say, grand larceny—than it is in
ours.23
One reason the efficient crime model is useful is that it provides
a simple picture that helps unify our view of legal sanctions. Its sim-
plicity is an advantage, especially for expository purposes, over the
more complicated, more correct, and more general model set out
21
 Readers who cannot imagine how a murder could be efficient may find the following
hypothetical of interest. A wealthy and bored big game hunter decidies that the only animal
dangerous enough to be really worth hunting is man. He accordingly offers a group of adven-
turers a million dollars each if each agrees that he may choose one of the ten at random and
attempt to kill him. Ten adventurers accept the offer. The contract is a Pareto improvement—
everyone concerned is better off, because the adventurers are each willing to accept a ten percent
chance of being picked in exchange for a million dollars (assume nobody else knows about the
contract). Yet many people would still believe that such a contract should not be enforced—that
murder ought to be illegal even between consenting adults.
22 See The Queen v. Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884), discussed in PosivEtt, supra note
3, at 241-42.
23 A further complication is that in such societies death may be a weaker sanction than in
ours, at least if the offender expects an attractive afterlife—which may explain why heretics were
often not merely executed, but executed in strikingly painfill ways. See POSNER, supra note 3, at
229-30; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204,
221 (1980).
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above. It is also an advantage over models that treat specific moral
judgments, such as our opposition to murder or theft, as givens, rather
than as conclusions to be derived from more general considerations
such as economic efficiency. Its generality is an advantage over the
alternative of considering separately offenses that we do not deter
because they are efficient (some speeding violations) and offenses that
we do not deter because it would cost too much to do so (some
murders).
A second reason why the model is a useful one is that although it
is quantitatively wrong, it is, for a wide range of cases, qualitatively
right. It does not tell us what the punishment for any particular offense
should be. But it does tell us, in most cases correctly, in what direction
changes in the characteristics of the offense will move the optimum
punishment.
If we actually used our theory to pick out offenses that should or
should not be deterred, the two models would give different results.
In practice, though, that is not how we use our theory, because we
usually do not have an accurate measure of the benefit to the offender
or the cost to the victim. Rather, we use the theory to produce quali-
tative conclusions, to argue, for instance, that certain offenses or cer-
tain offenders will, in an efficient system, be punished more severely
than others.24 If we believe that efficiency is desirable, we might also
use the analysis to make qualitative recommendations—to argue that
certain offenses ought to be punished more severely than others. As
we will see, arguments of this sort can be transferred intact from the
first model (efficient crimes) to the second. The quantitative conclu-
sions change and additional factors become relevant, but the qualita-
tive argument remains.
I have spoken in the abstract of how moving from one model to
the other affects the conclusions. The rest of this essay provides a series
of examples, showing both how an argument formulated in terms of
the prevention of inefficient crimes remains relevant under the more
sophisticated analysis and how the change introduces additional fac-
tors that might change the conclusion. I start with the question of how
punishment should be affected by the income of the offender, and
then go on to consider how it should be affected by the characteristics
of the victim—the central issue in Payne v. Tennessee.
24 If we believe that efficiency is desirable, we might also use the analysis to make qualitative
recommendations—to argue that certain offenses ought to be punished more severely than
others,
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II. SHOULD THE RICH PAY HIGHER FINES OR
RECEIVE SHORTER SENTENCES?
In an article published a few years ago in the Journal of Political
Economy, John Lott argued that the tendency of our legal system to
produce lower probabilities of conviction for higher income defen-
dants is evidence for, not against, the economic efficiency of the crimi-
nal justice system. 25
 His analysis used a model of efficient law enforce-
ment in which expected punishment was set at a level designed to deter
only inefficient crimes. His argument may be summarized as follows:
A month in jail, or a week in court, represents a larger dollar
cost to someone with a higher income; measured in money,
his time is more valuable. If rich defendants receive the same
jail sentences with the same probability as poor defendants,
then they are actually paying a higher (dollar) penalty. If the
efficient penalty is equal to the damage done, it should be
the same for rich and poor. It follows that an efficient legal
system will either impose lower (non-money) penalties on
richer defendants or impose them with lower probability. Our
legal system does in fact impose lower expected (non-money)
punishments on richer defendants; that is evidence in favor
of the thesis that our system is economically efficient. 26
How does the inclusion of punishment costs affect the conclusion
that richer people should receive lower expected jail sentences? In the
simplest case, it does not. If all the relevant functions—cost of appre-
hension, cost of punishment and elasticity of the supply of offenses—
are the same for rich and poor, then Lott's argument goes through in
this more complicated case. The optimal expected punishment is a
particular amount of money, hence fewer days in jail (or an equal fine)
for people with higher incomes.
Intuitively, that result makes sense. In Lott's model, imposing
equal jail terms on rich and poor would mean either that rich people
were being charged more than the damage done by their offenses (and
25John Lott, Should the Wealthy Be Able to Buy Justice,' 951 POL. ECIN. 1307-1316 (1987).
We would also expect, from applying the simple model to differences in the money equivalent
of the damage done rather than the money equivalent of the punishment, that fines for assaulting
rich people would be higher than for assaulting poor people. Here again, one may believe that
the result is unjust but also that it is correct—that in this regard our legal system does resemble
an economically efficient one, whether or not it should. Such distinctions were an explicit
element of the Anglo-Saxon law out of which our law developed.
26 Id.
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hence that some efficient crimes were being deterred) or that poor
people were being charged less than the damage done (and hence that
some inefficient crimes were occurring). In my model, equal jail terms
would mean that the marginal offense committed by a rich person,
while perhaps inefficient, would be less inefficient than the marginal
offense committed by a poor person—hence less worth the cost of
deterring. Both models imply equal fines for rich and poor, or unequal
jail sentences.
The assumption that the functions are independent of income is,
however, an implausible one, for several reasons. 27
 One, at least, brings
us back to one of the intuitions of those who believe that rich and poor
should receive the same jail sentences—and that the rich should pay
higher fines. 28 The supply function for offenses shows the number of
offenses as a function of the expected punishment. If punishments are
in money and rich and poor people have different values for money,
we would expect the deterrent effect of a given punishment to vary
with income. 29
To make the argument more rigorous, it is worth distinguishing
between two sorts of offenses—those that have a roughly equal payoff
in utility for rich and poor and those that have a roughly equal payoff
in money. Stealing $100 provides the same amount of money to a rich
person as to a poor person, so we would expect that the same fine
would deter it. Indeed, because the time of the rich person is worth
more dollars per hour than that of the poor, we would expect that if
they are equally good thieves, so that it takes each the same amount
27
 See generally Morris Raphael Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE Li. 987
(1990).
'it/ One scholar wrote:
Some crimes are attempts against the person, others against property. The penalties
For the first should always be corporal punishments.... The great and rich should
not have it in their power to set a price upon attempts made against the weak and
the poor; otherwise riches, which are, under the laws, the reward of industry,
become the nourishment of tyranny.. .. 1 shall limit myself to considering only the
punishments to be assigned to noblemen, asserting that they should be the same
for the first as fin . the least citizens,
CESARE BECGARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 69-70 (Henry Panlucci trans., 1963) (1764).
In this passage, Beccaria is arguing, in effect, for equal jail sentences rather than either equal
fines or unequal jail sentences; he does not consider the possibility of unequal lines. He goes on
to deal with the claim that the punishment really imposes a larger cost on a noble, because of
his greater education and greater vulnerability to social stigma, by arguing that the proper
measure of punishments is the public injury done and that greater damage is done by a crime
"when committed by a person of rank"—presumably because of the bad example. His argument
is in part consistent and in part in conflict with mine.
17 For more detail, see Friedman, supra note 12, at 189.
746	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 34:731
of time to steal $100, the rich man would be deterred by a lower fine
than the poor.
Consider, however, an offense whose payoff, measured in money,
is higher for richer offenders. One example would be saving ten
minutes by speeding; another would be slugging someone who you
were mad at. The money value of the offense is higher to the richer
offenders, so it will require a higher (money) punishment to deter
them.
Whether this implies a higher efficient punishment depends, in a
somewhat complicated way, on the shape of the supply function for
offenses and the related cost functions for deterrence.s° Where the rule
"impose just enough punishment to deter offenders" is a good approxi-
mation to the efficient rule, then the efficient system would impose
higher (dollar) punishments on higher income offenders, because
higher punishments are needed to deter them. The opposite result
occurs if imposing the high expected punishment necessary to deter
high income offenders is so costly that it is not worth deterring those
crimes.
So far, the only difference between high and low income offenders
I have considered is in the supply function for offenses. There is a
second difference with less ambiguous implications. A fine is a more
efficient punishment than a prison term, and richer offenders can pay
higher fines. Even if neither offender can pay a sufficiently high fine,
imposing a given dollar punishment via imprisonment requires fewer
days in jail for a higher income offender, and is therefore cheaper. So
punishment costs (per dollar of punishment) should decrease as in-
come rises, which implies a higher efficient dollar level of punishment
for richer offenders.3 '
"See id. at 187-9H, for an explanation and fOrmal analysis.
31 A similar argument might apply to the enforcement of rules regulating the behavior of
firms. Suppose that any judgment above $10 million will push a particular firm into bankruptcy.
Further suppose that bankruptcy is a bad thing—the real value of the firm is greater as a going
concern. In that case, a punishment of $11 million (of which only $10 million will be paid) is
much more costly than a punishment of $9 million. This would apply to criminal punishments,
civil punishments and administrative penalties. In each case, punishment cost becomes large
when the punishment reaches a level that creates a significant probability of bankruptcy and
becomes infinite when it exceeds the liquidation value of the firm. It follows that it may be
efficient to impose larger punishments on wealthier firms, even if the offense is the same.
Another application of the analysis would be to a firm attempting to control the behavior
of its employees. Some employees can be punished for malfeasance by firing, denial of promotion
or other internal sanctions. Others can only be punished by expensive legal procedures. The
optimal sanctions for employee malfeasance and the appropriate level of precautions will vary
accordingly.
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III. PAYNE. V. MNNESSEE: DOE'S THE VALUE OF THE
VICTIM'S LIFE MATTER?
Today'• majority has obviously been moved by an argument
that has strong political appeal but no proper place in a reasoned
judicial opinion. Because our decision in Lockett ... recognizes
the defendant's right to introduce all mitigating evidence that may
inform the jury about his character, the Court suggests that fair-
ness requires that the State be allowed to respond with similar
evidence about the victim. . . . This argument is a classic non
sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or
bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance.'"
On the face of it, Justice Stevens' argument seems compelling.
Permitting the character of the victim, like the character of the defen-
dant, to be introduced in evidence may be fair as between victim and
defendant, but the victim in a criminal case is not a party to the suit.
Insofar as fairness is relevant in that context, it is fairness between the
defendant and the state. And, as pointed out elsewhere in the dissent,"
the usual policy in criminal law is to try to tilt in favor of the defendant,
in order to balance the superior power of the state.
There is, however, a sense in which the Court's position is correct.
If, as I have been assuming, criminal law is intended to produce an
efficient outcome, then decisions about imposing the death penalty
involve balancing costs and benefits. One of the benefits is saving the
lives of potential victims by deterring crimes that might have been
committed against them." One of the costs is executing criminals. The
value of saving lives depends on the value of the lives saved; the cost
of execution depends on the value of the life ended. A correct decision
requires the jury to balance the value of the victim's life against the
value of the defendant's life." To that extent, the Court is right and
justice Stevens is wrong."
32
 Payne, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2627.
34 Like most economists, 1 assume that increasing the penalty for a clime will tend to decrease
its occurrence; I realize that some people disagree, and that there are other grounds on which
the case fin• and against capital punishment can be, and is, argued.
35
 Throughout illy discussion, 1 assume that the sentence is set by the jury, as was the case in
Payne. Essentially the sante arguments would apply if it were set by the judge instead.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should make it clear that 1 ant not claiming that jurors
(or judges) are necessarily trying to produce the economically efficient result, still less that they
always succeed in doing so. My claim is only that the relation between the value of the victim and
the value of the defendant is relevant both to the efficient decision and to the actual behavior
of the jury.
36
 For a general overview of the history of capital murder and the attempt to determine which
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This does not mean that murderers should be executed if and
only if their lives are deemed by the jury less valuable than their
victims' lives. Executing a particular murderer will not save his victim's
life—that is already lost. The jury's willingness to execute a particular
murderer for killing a particular sort of victim may, however, affect how
many similar murders occur in the future. There is a tradeoff between
murderers' lives and victims' lives, although not necessarily at a rate of
one for one."
To the extent that potential murderers know the value of the lives
of their potential victims, the rule announced by the Court means that
expected punishment as perceived by the offenders is an increasing
function of the damage done by the offense, as efficiency requires. The
murderer in Payne was aware of the fact which the prosecution used
in arguing for the death penalty, that his victim was a mother with two
small children." In such cases the Court's rule will tend, cceteris paribus,
to increase the protection that the law provides to mothers of small
children, and to other victims whose death will impose large costs on
their survivors. Someone contemplating killing such a person will
expect a more severe penalty, and thus be more likely to be deterred.
The rule established by Payne would also permit such evidence to
be introduced in cases where the offender was not aware of the rele-
vant facts at the time of the murder. The dissent argued that this
feature of the rule violated the Eighth Amendment because it could
make the application of the death penalty depend on something ir-
relevant to the wickedness of the murderer's act." A similar argument
could be made from an economic standpoint. If murderers do not
know the value of their victims' lives, then selective punishment will
murderers ought to be executed, see MODEL PENAL. CODE § 210.6 commentary, at 110-71 (Ameri-
can Law Institute 1985).
"Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life and Death, 65 Am.
ECON. REV. 397, 414-15 (1975) (concluding that each execution deterred several murders).
38
 He was not aware that one of the children would survive, to be the subject of the
prosecutor's oratory. The dissent did not, however, try to argue that, having done his best to kill
all three victims, Payne should not be held morally responsible for the emotional pain to the one
who survived.
38 Payne, Ill S. Ct. 2627, 2629 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Where, as is ordinarily the
case, the defendant was unaware of the personal circumstances of his victim, admitting evidence
of the victim's character and the impact of the murder upon the victim's family predicates the
sentencing determination on factors . . . wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of [thel
particular defendant." Id. at 2619-20. The dissent also argued that, even if the defendant was
aware of the relevant circumstances, presenting them to the jury would tend to produce a decision
based on emotion rather than reason. Id. at 2620-21. The experience of reading the case, surely
less moving than the experience of sitting through it, provides both evidence for this claim and
a powerful argument in favor of the jury's decision.
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not provide selective deterrence. Even if potential murderers know
they will be punished more severely for killing certain kinds of victims,
they do not know whether their potential victim is one of them. 4°
In this case, however, the Court's position can be defended in a
slightly different way. Even if all victims are identical, so that the issue
of selective deterrence does not arise, there is still the problem of
deciding what the penalty for murder should be. A more severe penalty
imposes larger costs on convicted murderers in order to deter crimes
and reduce the cost to potential victims. Where the decision is whether
to impose capital punishment for murder, the jury is deciding whether
to sacrifice the life of a specific murderer in order to save the lives of
generic victims. In choosing a penalty, the jury is implicitly balancing
those costs and benefits.
If the legal rules present the defendant as a living, breathing
human being with loving parents weeping on the witness stand, while
presenting the victim as a shadowy abstraction, the result will be to
overstate, in the minds of the jury, the cost of capital punishment
relative to the benefit. The rule announced in Payne can be inter-
preted, not as a way of giving the jury information about the special
value of one victim relative to other victims, but as a way of reminding
the jury that victims, like criminals, are human beings with parents and
children, lives that matter to themselves and others. That seems to be
relevant information, if the jury is to decide whether the benefit of
deterring some murders is worth the cost of executing some murder-
ers.'"
So far in this section I have not distinguished between the simple
version of the efficient punishment model and the correct version. The
reason is that both lead to the same conclusion. If our objective is to
40 1f the criminal has some information about the value of the victim's life—knows, for
example, that she is of an age at which she is likely to be a mother with small children—then
selective punishment produces some selective deterrence, although less than if the criminal were
perfectly informed about the victim, This point is discussed at greater length below.
41 The point is demonstrated, unintentionally, by one of the briefs opposing the result
eventually reached by the court
In the case at bar, therefore, the prosecution could have argued to the jury that
the perpetrator likely knew that, if by chance a child survived the attack, he or she
would long for his or her mother or sibling.
The fact that the prosecution could have made this argument does not justify its
formal presentation of Ms. Zvolanek's testimony in blatant violation of Booth, Her
live emotional testimony that Nicholas did in fact cry for his mother, that he
repeatedly asked for "my Lade," and that he asked his grandmother if she "also
missed Lacie" is markedly different from the prosecutor's merely drawing a general
inference during an argument.
Brief of Petitioner, Payne v, Tennessee, 111 S. CL 2597 (1989).
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prevent all inefficient murders by setting punishment equal to damage
done, then the punishment for destroying a life should be higher when
the life is more valuable. If our objective is to prevent murders when-
ever the cost of prevention is less than the net damage done by the
murder, then we should be willing to pay the cost of more severe
punishments—execution rather than imprisonment, for example—for
murders that do more damage. The result in Payne v. Tennessee makes
sense in terms of both the simple and the complicated versions of the
model.
One feature of the decision that does not seem to fit either version
of the efficient punishment model, however, is the Court's discussion
of what "value of life" means. 42 The Court explicitly rejected the idea
of comparing the value of one life to the value of another, and seemed
to reject the idea of evaluating lives on any economic basis. 4s The
dissent responded by arguing that, without such a comparison, evi-
dence about the victims would tell the jury nothing they did not
already know, and would introduce such illicit considerations as the
victim's status in the community."
One way of making sense out of the Court's position has already
been suggested. If the objective of victim impact statements is not to
give the jury special information about why one victim is more deserv-
ing than another, but rather to remind the jury of the value of the lives
of victims, then no comparative judgment among victims is required.
The comparative judgment is rather between the lives of victims and
42 Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1989).
43 See id. Payne echoes the concern voiced in Booth's case that the admission of victim impact
evidence permits a jury to find that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are
more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Booth,
482 U.S. at 506 n.8. As a general matter, however, victim impact evidence is not offered to
encourage comparative judgments of this kind. Rather, it is designed to show instead each victim's
"uniqueness as an individual human being," whatever the jury might think to be the loss to the
community. The facts of Gathers are an excellent illustration of this: the evidence showed that
the victim was an unemployed, mentally handicapped individual, perhaps not, in the eyes of most,
a significant contributor to society, but nonetheless a murdered human being. Payne, I II S. Ct.
at 2607.
In contrast, the amicus brief by the State of California argued for comparative judgments
among victims: "Contrary to the assumptions in Booth, the harm to society may be greater
depending upon the characteristics of the victim. The murder of a police officer, parent or child
harms society more than the murder of a drug dealing child molester."
41 Id. at 2620 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As another dissent noted, "The fact that each of us
is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support. What is not
obvious, however, is the way in which the character or reputation in one case may differ from
that of other possible victims. Evidence offered to prove such differences can only he intended •
to identify sonic victims as more worthy of protection than others." Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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the lives of their murderers. This interpretation seems more consistent
with what the Court actually said than the alternative, in which victim
impact statements are intended to provide the information necessary
for selective deterrence. 4'
A second possible justification for the Court's position was implied
by the Attorneys General of Tennessee and the United States in oral
argument.46 Even if juries cannot compare the life of one victim to the
life of another, the victim is not the only injured party. If the effect of
one murder is simply to kill the victim, while the effect of another is
to kill the victim and orphan her two small children, one can argue
that the latter is a more serious offense even though the lives of the
victims themselves are equally valuable. 47
If either of these interpretations is correct, then the Court, like
the dissent, is rejecting one of the implications of the economic ap-
proach to criminal law. Where criminals are, or might be, aware of
characteristics that affect the value of the lives of their victims, selective
punishment would provide selective deterrence and thus make the
criminal law more efficient. The result in Payne v. Tennessee will allow
that to happen but only, to judge by the Court's dicta, as an unintended
consequence.
IV. PUNISHMENT BY CONSEQUENCES: THE SELECTIVE DETERRENCE OF
IMPERFECTLY INFORMED CRIMINALS
One argument made repeatedly in both Payne and the prior
literature is that it is unjust to make the punishment of criminals
depend on factors, such as characteristics of victims, of which they were
unaware when they committed the crime. 45 A similar argument applies
45 Another possible interpretation of what is actually happening in cases like Payne is that
the prosecution is establishing not the value of the victim's life, but the innocence of the victim.
Jurors may be more likely to identify with victims who are entirely innocent than with those who
were, in some sense, partly the cause of their own deaths. One example would be a drug dealer
killed by a rival; a less clear one would be the victim in a marital quarrel. This point was suggested
to me by Wendy Gordon. Such considerations were not raised by either the Court or the dissent.
"Tennessee Attorney General Burson distinguished during the hearing between "worth and
sanctity of a human life," which is the same for all lives, and societal harm, which might vary from
one victim to another. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.. 2597
(1989). United States Attorney General Thornburgh responded to a question by justice Scalia,
"It's not the characteristics themselves but what has resulted from the death of that individual in
a loss to the victim, the family, and the community." Id. at 54.
47 The civil law, in cases of wrongful death, has traditionally carried this argument even
further, basing damages upon the injury to everyone except the victim. The concept of "hedonic
damages" represents a recent attempt to include in the calculation the value of the victim's life
to himself.
48 See Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2628.
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if one's concern is efficient deterrence. In most real cases, however,
criminals are neither perfectly informed nor perfectly ignorant. Even
someone who murders a stranger in the course of a robbery is likely
to have some idea of the age and sex of the victim, which are relevant
to the probability that the victim is a mother with small children. In
less anonymous cases, the criminal is likely to have more information.
In Payne, the only relevant pieces of information the criminal did not
have when he committed the murder were that one of his victims
would survive and the details of how that victim would react to the
death of his mother and sister.
This raises the question of how the economic analysis of selective
deterrence applies to a criminal with some, although imperfect, infor-
mation.49 The answer to that question provides another example of the
general thesis of this essay—that the simple version of the economic
analysis of optimal punishment gives a first approximation, but only a
first approximation, to the result of the correct model.
In order to see that, consider a simple case. There are two types
of victims—low-value victims and high-value victims. 50 The total dam-
age done to everyone affected by a murder—the victim, survivors,
other members of society—is H for a low-value victim and 2H for a
high-value victim. Each potential murderer i has a probability p, that
his victim is a low-value victim and 1 – p, that his victim is a high-value
victim.5 ' Each actual murderer has a .5 probability of being appre-
hended and convicted. 52 What is the consequence of making the pun-
ishment of a convicted murderer depend on the value of his victim?
How does that legal rule compare, from the standpoint of economic
efficiency, with the alternatives of either imposing the same punish-
ment on all murderers or making the punishment depend upon what
45 In this discussion, I am taking the criminal's knowledge as given. One effect of a legal
system that made the severity of punishment depend, in part, on the characteristics of the victim
would be to give potential criminals an incentive to learn more about potential victims before
deciding whether to kill them.
50 At this point I am adopting the view the court rejected—that punishment should vary with
the value of the victim's life. Readers who are uncomfortable with the idea that some victims are
more valuable than others may wish to think of high-value victims as mothers with small children
and low-value victims as ninety-year-old men with incurable cancer. Those who are still uncom-
ffirtable with the idea may wish to transfer the analysis to some less serious crime than murder,
and consider it as applicable to the question of whether imperfectly foreseen harm should be
considered in setting the sentence for that crime.
51 The probability is a description of what potential murderers know when they decide
whether to commit a murder. It is their knowledge that is relevant to their decisions, and it is
their decisions that we are trying to affect by imposing a punishment in order to deter a crime.
52 In a more elaborate analysis, one would want to let the probability of apprehension depend
on the value of the victim; the police could, probably do, and in an efficient system probably
would, try harder to apprehend murderers of victims whom they consider more valuable.
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the court believes the murderer knew at the time of the crime—the
court's estimate of 14?
We first consider this question in the context of the simple model.
We assume there are no costs of punishment's or apprehension. Our
objective, therefore, is to set the expected punishment equal to the
damage done, deterring all inefficient crimes and only inefficient
crimes. We do so by setting the punishment at 2H for killing a low-value
victim (expected punishment = probability of conviction X 2H = H
= damage done) and 4H for killing a high-value victim.
Consider a potential criminal i. The expected harm the offense
will do is the probability the victim is low-value times H, plus the
probability his victim is high-value times 2H, which is:
Harm = pi X 1-1 + (1 – pi) X 2H
if i commits the murder, his expected punishment is the probability
his victim is low-value (pi), times the expected punishment for kill-
ing a low-value victim, plus the probability his victim is high-value
( 1 – pi), times the expected punishment for killing a high-value
victim, giving:
Punishment = .5 X pi x 2H + .5 X ( 1 – pi) X 4H
= pi x H + (1 – x 2H = Harm
So expected punishment equals expected harm, whatever pi may be.
To put the same analysis verbally, expected damage is a weighted
average of actual damage, averaged over possible victims, expected
punishment is a weighted average of expected punishment for killing
a particular victim, also averaged over possible victims, and the weights
(pi and 1 – pi) are the same in both cases, so if actual punishment
equals actual damage, expected punishment will equal expected dam-
age. Selective punishment thus results in the schedule of expected
punishments that the court would impose if it knew pi and could
calculate the expected damage imposed by each murder and adjust
the punishment accordingly." That is a more efficient result than could
be imposed directly by a court with anything short of perfect informa-
tion about what each criminal knew when he committed his crime."'
"This assumption implies that criminals are risk neutral; an uncertain but otherwise costless
punishment imposed on a risk-averse criminal would generate a cost of risk bearing.
54 This appears to be the policy advocated by most of the opponents of the Court's decision
in Payne, insofar. as they are willing to accept the idea that the consequences of some murders
are predictably more heinous than the consequences of others.
"Throughout this analysis I assume that any attempt at selective deterrence by a court must
be based on the criminal's beliefs about the victim. One could imagine a system where a court
was better informed than the criminal, ex ante, about the costs imposed by a particular offense,
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Consider the limiting case where potential criminals know noth-
ing about their potential victims. In that case, p, is the same for all i,
say .5. Each criminal faces an expected punishment of (3/2)H, equal
to the expected harm clone by the crime. The criminal has one chance
in four of being convicted of killing a low-value victim (punishment
21- ) and one chance in four of being convicted of killing a high-value
victim (punishment 41-1). Because criminals are assumed to be risk-neu-
tral, this is equivalent to a system where all criminals who were con-
victed (probability one-half) received a punishment of 3H.
In the worst case for selective punishment, where criminals have
no information about their victims, or the best case for punishment
based on criminals' knowledge, where the court has perfect informa-
tion about each criminal, punishment according to outcome (what sort
of victim actually got killed) is no worse than the alternatives. In any
other situation it is better.
What happens to this result in the more sophisticated model,
where we include in our calculations the cost of catching and punish-
ing criminals? The answer is that the argument carries over in a
qualitative but not a quantitative sense. It is still true that selective
punishment results in a higher expected punishment for criminals
whose victims are more likely to be of high value, and that a higher
punishment for those criminals is desirable. But it is no longer true
that selective punishment produces the optimal result, nor that it is
better than the alternatives as long as criminals have some information,
however little, about their victims, and courts have less than perfect
information about criminals. This is true for two reasons. The first is
that, although an efficient system will, aeteris paribus, impose higher
punishments on offenses that do more damage, the relation is no
longer one of simple proportionality between damage done and
efficient punishment. The optimal expected punishment, for reasons
explained above, is damage minus the cost of adjusting the schedule
of punishments (and enforcement) to reduce the number of offenses
by one.56
 That cost will generally be different at different levels of
and conveyed that information to the potential criminal by announcements about its penalty
schedule. For example, the court might, as some legislatures do, announce that the lives of police
officers are especially valuable, and therefore the penalty for killing one is death.
lit my analysis, I am concerned with how a court uses the criminal's knowledge about the
victim to provide selective deterrence—either by basing punishment on what the court thinks
the criminal knew, or by basing punishment on the actual outcome and relying on the effect of
that policy working through the criminal's probabilities for the alternative outcomes. See David
Friedman, Deterring Imperfectly Informed Tortftasors: Optimal Rules far Penally and Liability (1992)
(manuscript available from the author).
t6 See Equation 2 supra and accompanying text; see also Friedman, supra note 12, at 190-92.
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punishment. There is no reason to expect that an offense doing twice
as much damage should be punished exactly twice as severely. The
optimal punishment might be three times, or only one and a half times,
as large.
Criminals, in calculating the expected punishment they face, av-
erage the punishments for killing the two different kinds of victims,
using as weights the relevant probabilities. But the optimal punishment
calculated using the more sophisticated model is not simply the
weighted average of the two punishments. Therefore, expected pun-
ishments that criminals calculate will vary in the right qualitative way—
they will be higher for criminals who have a higher probability of
killing high-value victims and thus doing more damage—but they may
well be different from the optimal punishments that would be set by a
court that had all the information the criminals had and used that
knowledge to make punishment depend on what the criminal knew at
the time of the offense.
The second reason why selective punishment is no longer neces-
sarily optimal is that, once we introduce punishment costs, different
patterns of punishment that are equivalent from the standpoint of the
criminal may no longer be equivalent from the standpoint of the rest
of society—instead, they may have different costs. To see the relevance
of this, again consider the case where criminals have no information
about their victims, with pi = .5 for all i. With selective punishment,
criminals who are convicted face a .5 chance of the punishment for
killing a high-value victim, plus a .5 chance of the punishment for
killing a low-value victim. Even if this punishment lottery happens to
produce the right expected punishment, it may not be the least expen-
sive way of doing so. It might be less expensive to choose an interme-
diate punishment and impose it on all offenders.
Consider the following example. It may well be that execution,
because of the repulsion toward killing in our society, is a much more
inefficient punishment than imprisonment—one that imposes a larger
cost per unit of deterrence.57 Suppose that, from the standpoint of the
criminal, life imprisonment is exactly equivalent—exerts the same de-
terrent effect—as a fifty percent chance of execution combined with a
fifty percent chance of a ten-year sentence. If so, and if the social cost
of the latter alternative is higher than the social cost of the former,
57 Here, as in most (but not all) of the law and economics literature, the social cost of the
punishment includes both the cost to the criminal (his life, in the case of capital punishment)
and the cost to others, including moral revulsion, the cost of running prisons, the hangman's
fee, etc.
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then selective punishment of completely ignorant criminals (execution
for killing a high-value victim and ten years for killing a low-value
victim) provides the same deterrence as unselective punishment (life
for all murderers), but at a higher costae
In this case, as in the case discussed earlier where punishment
might vary with the income of the criminal, the simple model of
deterring all inefficient crimes and only inefficient crimes gives us an
approximation of the right answer, but only an approximation. The
argument and the conclusion carry over to the sophisticated model,
but only approximately. If criminals know a good deal about their
potential victims (pi varies substantially with i), and courts do not know
much about what criminals know (courts do not have good informa-
tion about p,), selective punishment based on victim characteristics is
probably more efficient than either unselective punishment (all mur-
derers get treated equally) or selective punishments based on the
court's estimate of the criminal's knowledge at the time of the crime.
If criminals are badly informed, or if courts are well informed about
what criminals know, selective punishment based on victim charac-
teristics is still superior in the simple model, but not in the sophisti-
cated mode1.59
I have discussed this question in the context of capital punishment
for murder, because that was the issue raised by Payne, but the analysis
applies more generally. The argument of this section provides both an
economic justification for making the severity of the punishment im-
posed for a crime (or the amount of damages awarded for a tort) vary
with the damage done and a qualification to that justification in situ-
ations where offenders are badly informed about the consequences of
their acts and courts are well informed about the minds of offenders.
58
 Such a situation is particularly likely if one of the alternatives has a very low probability
but a very high cost. Consider a crime, such as replacing the medicine in a bottle with aspirin or
putting a sub-lethal dose of poison on Chilean produce in a U.S. grocery store as a protest against
the policies of the Chilean government, which usually does no significant damage but has a small
probability of killing someone. The equivalent of selective deterrence would be a policy of
punishing the perpetrator according to the damage done—a small fine most of the time, and
execution if someone dies. It may be less costly and more effective to instead impose a moderately
severe punishment based on the expected damage. A version of this example was suggested to
me by David Emmanuel,
•' 9 This result must be stated in such an imprecise form because I have not specified the actual
form of the relevant supply curve (of offenses as a function of expected punishment) and cost
curves (for punishment, apprehension and conviction). If the additional term in the optimal
punishment calculation added by the existence of these costs varies only slightly over the relevant
range of punishments, then the sophisticated model gives almost the same result as the simple
model. In that case, either a very well-informed court or a very badly informed set of criminals
would be necessary to make selective punishment by victim less efficient than selective punish-
ment by a court's estimate of each criminal's knowledge.
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In the context of tort law, the same argument provides a justification
for the familiar rule that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds
him. 60
Throughout the discussion, I have assumed that after the offense
has occurred it is possible to measure the consequences, and that it is
therefore at least possible, although not necessarily desirable, to make
the punishment depend on the damage done. There are some inter-
esting cases where that is not possible. Many, such as pollution, are
handled through the regulatory system. The emission of a particular
pollutant at a particular place and time may do no damage at all, or it
may result in someone dying who would otherwise have lived. Punish-
ment is based on some ex ante estimate of expected cost, because actual
cost can usually not be measured. A similar problem occasionally arises
in tort law, as in the DES cases,''' where it was impossible to assign
liability for particular injuries to particular defendants.
V. PAYNE, MCCLESKEY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS
Neither the Payne Court nor the dissent discussed in detail the
reasons for rejecting comparative judgments among victims, and hence
selective deterrence. One obvious candidate is the general norm of
equal protection, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution." This possibility is suggested by the evidence offered
by the defense in another case, McCleskey v. Kemp."'
In McCleskey, a Georgia trial court convicted a black man of the
murder of a white police officer. 64 Appealing his conviction and death
penalty, the defendant claimed that the Georgia capital sentencing
process was racially discriminatory in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 65 From the standpoint of the present discussion,
one striking feature of that case is the failure of either the majority or
minority opinions to apply the principle of equal protection to the
protection of potential victims. To see why one might have expected
that issue to arise, it is worth reviewing the evidence offered:
In support of his claim, McCleskey proffered a statistical study
performed by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski,
6°This issue is discussed at greater length in Freidman, supra note 55. For a somewhat
different view, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Optimal Liability When the Injurer's Information About the
Victim's Loss Is Imperfect, 7 IRLE 139-47 (1987).
61 See, e.g., Murphy v, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc„ 710 P.2d 247 (1985); Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
607 P.2d 924 (1980).
"2 U.S. Corsi. amend. XIV.
"3 481 U.S. 279 (1986).
"4 Id. at 279.
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and George Woodworth (the Baldus study) that purports to
show a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in
Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a
lesser extent, the race of the defendant. The Baldus study is
actually two sophisticated statistical studies that examine over
2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the
1970's. The raw numbers collected by Professor Baldus indi-
cate that defendants charged with killing white persons re-
ceived the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants
charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only
1% of the cases. The raw numbers also indicate a reverse
racial disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of
the black defendants received the death penalty, as opposed
to 7% of the white defendants.
. . . Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking
account of 230 variables that could have explained the dis-
parities on nonracial grounds. One of his models concludes
that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, de-
fendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with
killing blacks, According to this model, black defendants were
1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defen-
dants."
The defense argued that this evidence showed an unconstitutional
discrimination against black defendants. On the evidence pre-
sented, the direction of the discrimination is ambiguous. Black
murderers appear slightly more likely to receive a death sentence
than white murderers, all other things held constant—including the
race of the victim. But black murderers, on average, kill black
victims—with the result that actual black murderers are substantially
less likely than actual white murderers to receive a death sentence-
4 percent versus 7 percent."
"5 Id.
66 Id. at 286.
r'7 "Most black victims are killed by black murderers, and a disproportionate number of
murder victims is black. Wherefore the discrimination in favor of murderers of black victims more
than offsets, numerically, any remaining discrimination against other black murderers." Ernest
van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV, 957, 961 (1985). "Those who
demonstrated the patterns seem to have been under the impression that they had shown discrimi-
nation against black murderers. They were wrong. However, the discrimination against black
victims is invidious and should be corrected." Id. at 961 n.23. Gary Kieck found that the risk of
a death sentence was higher for a white defendant than a black defendant throughout the period
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What is unambiguous is the discrimination against black victims."
The evidence suggests that, all other things held constant, the mur-
derer of a white victim is more than four times as likely as the murderer
of a black victim to receive a death sentence. If we take murders as
they occur, rather than trying to use statistical methods to control for
factors that correlate with race, the actual murderer of a white victim
in Georgia was about eleven times as likely as the murderer of a black
victim to receive the death penalty. 69
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: ". . .
nor shall any State ... deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Part of the protection I receive from the law,
arguably the most important part, is the protection provided by a legal
system that punishes crimes committed against me. One important
argument in favor of the death penalty is that it deters more effectively
than lesser punishments. If so, then the evidence presented in
McCleskey strongly suggests that blacks in Georgia get substantially less
protection of the law from murder than do whites. It seems odd that
neither the Court nor (with one partial exception) the minority in the
case discussed that issue.''
The Court in McCleskey neither explicitly accepted nor rejected
the proposition that a judicial system whose policies resulted in less
1967-1978, presumably because of discrimination by race of victim. Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimi-
nation in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the
Death Penalty, 46 Am. Soc. REv. 783, 797-98 (1981).
IN See Norval Morris, Race and Crime, 72 junicATuRE 111 (1988). For a survey of the various
studies, see Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination
in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275 (1985). The author concludes, "The scientific
implications of these studies are simple. The evidence indicates, unmistakably, that there has been
substantial discrimination in capital sentencing by race of victim, at least in those states that have
been extensively studied." Id. at 1282.
69
	[Baldus's models] showed race-of-victim disparities, virtually all of which were highly
statistically significant. Many showed race-of-defendant disparities as well." McCleskey v. Kemp,
Statement of the Case: Petitioner's Record Evidence, in 171 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
ME SUPREME COURT (ir THE UNITED STATES 468-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.
1988). Race of defendant disparities also regularly appeared, although not with the invariable
consistency of the victim statistics.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71 The one exception is a passage in Justice Blackmun's dissent which raises the issue of
unequal protection of potential victims but does not apply it to the case under discussion. See
481 U.S. 279, 346 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing history of discriminatory law
enforcement dining post-Civil War era). The Court did not discuss the implication that Georgia's
law might be unconstitutional because it failed to protect black potential victims, Thus the Court
wrote: "Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his victim, other claims could apply
with equally logical force to statistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors
in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys." Id. at 317.
It is possible that the Court ignored the issue on the grounds of lack of standing, as
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protection for blacks than for whites violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. If the Court had rejected that proposition, it might still have
accepted the weaker claim that features of a legal system deliberately
designed to provide different levels of protection to different potential
victims were unconstitutional. Even if it is obvious that the law does
not, in practice, protect everyone equally, it may still be improper to
make stronger protection for more valuable lives an explicit justifica-
tion for a legal rule. If the objective of criminal punishment is deter-
rence, then using selective punishment to produce selective deterrence
implies that the law is deliberately choosing to protect some potential
victims more than others. If so, that would provide an explanation of
the Court's unwillingness to base its defense of victim impact state-
ments on their ability to provide selective deterrence.
The dissent hints at a slightly different reason. If it is appropriate
to impose especially high punishments on the murderers of especially
valuable victims, then it would seem equally appropriate to impose
especially low punishments on the murderers of especially worthless
victims. This raises the specter of a system where sufficiently unpopular
people—prostitutes, drug users and members of unpopular religious,
racial, or political groups—could be killed with impunity. 72
One way that a court might try to deal with this problem would
be by creating a legal rule that permitted victim impact statements by
the prosecution but not by the defense—a possibility discussed in the
oral argument." Because the prosecution would presumably be trying
to get as high a punishment as possible, only evidence favorable to the
victim would be introduced. Aside from due process concerns, this
raises interesting difficulties of a game—theoretic nature.
A. Will Prosecutors Tell All?
Suppose we have a legal system in which the prosecution, but not
the defense, may introduce evidence on characteristics of the victim.
McCleskey was a murderer, not a victim. But, as the recent case of Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364
(1989), shows, a convicted criminal can sometimes succeed in raising a fits tertii defense based
on the violation of someone else's rights.
72 See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Thxasjudge Eases Sentence for Killer of 2 Homosexuals, N.Y. Timm, Dec.
17, 1988, § I, at 8 (thirty-year sentence for murders of two homosexuals explained by: "I put
prostitutes and gays at about the same level. And I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing
a prostitute."). From the standpoint of economics, if not of justice, this is a problem of jury error.
There is nothing inefficient about a system where the punishment for ending a life with little
value—say the life of someone who is dying from cancer and has only a few days left—is relatively
low. The problem is that the jury may be measuring, not how much the victim's life is worth, but
how much it is worth to the jury—which is a very different thing.
79 See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). The Court held that certain negative
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Further assume that the objective of each prosecutor is to get as severe
a sentence as possible in the case currently being prosecuted, and that
juries are fully rational and aware of how prosecutors behave. Finally,
assume that the characteristics of victims can be ranked by their po-
tential effect on the jury, and that prosecutors are aware of the ranking;
they know how juries will react to the facts about particular victims.
How will prosecutors behave?
Suppose a prosecutor follows a policy of only introducing evidence
on the characteristics of a victim if the victim is "above average"—if the
information will lead the jury to impose a more severe sentence than
if the jury knew nothing at all about the victim. The problem with this
policy is that having the jury know nothing at all about the victim is
not one of the prosecutor's options, because the jury can get informa-
tion not only from what the prosecutor says but from what the prose-
cutor does not say. When the prosecutor chooses not to introduce
evidence on the characteristics of the victim, a rational jury will deduce
that the victim must be below average. The jury will therefore treat the
victim about whom it has been told nothing not as an average victim
but as an average unattractive victim—and reduce its sentence accord-
ingly.
To make the argument more precise, imagine that we rank the
victims on a percentile scale, with the most attractive victim rated 1.00,
the median victim 0.50, and the least attractive 0.00. Prosecutors pick
some X between 0 and 1 and introduce evidence on the victim's
characteristics if and only if the victim rates above X. If the prosecutor
does not introduce such evidence, a rational jury aware of how prose-
cutors behave will conclude that the victim ranks between 0 and X, and
will base the verdict on an average victim, ranking about X/2.
Consider a prosecutor in a case where the victim ranks slightly
below X but above X/2. Such a prosecutor can expect to get a more
severe sentence by revealing the victim's characteristics to the jury than
by keeping them secret. So a strategy of only introducing evidence for
victims who rank above X is unstable—it pays a prosecutor to break
the rule by introducing evidence on any victim slightly below the
cutoff.. The argument applies as long as X is greater than zero. The
only stable strategy is for prosecutors to introduce evidence on the
characteristics of all but the least attractive victims.
information about the offender (his membership in a prison gang called Aryan Brotherhood)
could not be introduced in the sentencing stage of the trial, even though all positive evidence
could be. The Court based its decision on First Amendment grounds, but Justice Thomas, the
lone dissenter, argued that the case created a double standard allowing defense. lawyers to point
out good associations but finhidding prosecutors from pointing out bad ones.
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This analysis assumes that prosecutors, in deciding whether to
introduce evidence in a case, consider only the effect on the outcome
of that case. A single prosecutor controlling all cases would realize that
lowering X in order to get abetter result in one case would produce
a worse result in cases where he or she chose not to reveal the infor-
mation, because a lower X would result in a lower estimate by the jury
of the attractiveness of victims whose characteristics were not revealed.
In such a situation, the two effects on the average verdict of
changes in X tend to balance each other. For each victim, there is a
penalty that a fully informed jury would give to the victim's killer. If
the penalty chosen by a jury ignorant of the victim's characteristics is
simply its desired penalty averaged over the characteristics the victim
might have had, the balancing is exact; with more complicated jury
preferences it is not. 14 In the simple case, at least, a single prosecutor
controlling all cases would be indifferent to the level of X, unless the
prosecutor, like the jury, was in favor of giving more severe punish-
ments to defendants who had killed more attractive victims, in which
case the prosecutor would set X = 0 and reveal all.
In a system with many prosecutors, where jurors know the behav-
ior of prosecutors in general but not of an individual prosecutor, and
each individual prosecutor is more concerned with the severity of his
or her sentences than with the severity of the sentences won by other
prosecutors, the incentive for a prosecutor to lower Xis stronger. Most
of the undesirable effect of lowering X in a particular case is borne by
other prosecutors in other cases, so the gain to a prosecutor from
lowering X for his or her cases will almost always be less than the loss,
making the only stable situation one in which X = 0 and juries are
fully informed of the characteristics of victims.
So there is reason to believe that rational prosecutors dealing with
rational juries would find themselves driven to tell all—to reveal the
characteristics of all but the least attractive victims. Rational juries
would then deduce that any case in which the prosecution did not
provide a victim impact statement involved an extraordinarily unattrac-
tive victim, and set the sentence accordingly. In such a situation, giving
only the prosecution the power to introduce evidence on victim char-
acteristics would not be sufficient to protect unattractive victims.
74 For instance, jurors may be more or less willing to impose a given average level of
punishment if they believe that it will go selectively to those who have killed particularly valuable
victims. One could imagine a juror who considered it very important to deter killers of young
mothers, but only moderately important to deter killers of old men. With no information on
victim characteristics, this juror would favor the death penalty for all murderers, in order to get
a sufficiently high level of deterrence against those who killed young mothers.
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If this argument is correct, there may be no way of achieving the
efficiency gains of selective deterrence without the cost of permitting
juries to effectively nullify the law against murdering unpopular peo-
ple. This would be a strong argument against the result in Payne if
there were no other way in which juries could achieve that undesirable
result. Unfortunately, that is not the case. One of the costs of a jury
system is the potential for jury nullification of good laws as well as bad
ones.
VI. PUNISHMENT BY DESERT OR PUNISHMENT BY CONSEQUENCE:
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK
A second issue suggested by Payne v. Tennessee raises some philo-
sophical puzzles about what ought to determine punishment. The
dissent argued that, at least in the case of capital punishment, the only
thing that matters is the blameworthiness of the particular defendant.
If, as may often be the case, murderers do not know much about the
victims when they decide to kill them, then the victims' characteristics
are irrelevant to how wicked the criminals are and should be irrelevant
to the criminals' punishment. A victim impact statement, in those cases
where the criminal did not know the victim, makes the murderer's
punishment depend on morally irrelevant factors, and should there-
fore be prohibited.
In order to fit this argument into the discussion of this Article, I
now drop the assumption that economic efficiency is the only value by
which legal rules ought to be judged. Suppose we assume, instead, that
efficiency and justice are distinct goals, and that both arc desirable. We
may be willing to accept some reduction in efficiency in order to make
our system more just, and we may be willing to accept some reduction
in justice in order to make the system more efficient. How will this
change in our assumptions alter our conclusions so far as the question
of punishing by results is concerned? If it is just to impose a more
severe punishment on a criminal who has done more damage, then
that reinforces any efficiency arguments in favor of punishment by
consequences. If, on the other hand, the only just basis of punishment
is the nature of the act as perceived by criminals when they commit
their crimes, that is an argument for basing punishment on the best
estimate the court can make of ex ante expected injury rather than on
the court's observation of ex post actual injury—even if we conclude
that the latter rule would be more efficient
On the face of it, the moral argument against basing punishment
on actual consequences seems to apply to all crimes and punishments,
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not merely murder and execution. 75 If punishment ought to be a
function of how blameworthy the criminal is, then punishment should
never be affected by factors that the criminal did not know about or
could not control. That sounds persuasive, but it does not describe how
our system actually works.76
 Indeed, it probably does not describe how
any legal system actually works. A drunk driver who runs into a tree is
subject to considerably less severe sanctions than one who runs into a
pedestrian. A gunman whose victim survives is guilty of attempted
murder; one whose victim dies is guilty of actual murder. The blame-
worthiness is the same, but the penalty is different. 77 In a wide range
75 Richard S. Murphey, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy
of Punishment in the. Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303 (1988). The author argues that, on
a retribution theory of punishment, the harm criminals actually cause is irrelevant to the pun-
ishment they deserve, and that the "Supreme Court's decision in Booth, by holding that victim
impact statements are per se irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision, is completely consistent
with and in fact required by the retributivist model of punishment." Id. at 1309.
76 H.L.A. Hart noted:
The almost universal tendency in punishing to discriminate between attempts and
completed crimes rests, 1 think, on a version of the retributive theory which has
permeated certain branches of English law, . This is the simple theory that it is
a perfectly legitimate ground to grade punishments according to the amount of
harm actually done, whether this was intended or not.... To many people such a
theory of punishment seems to confuse punishment with compensation.... Why
should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be
a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally
wicked? I may be wrong in thinking that there is little to be said for this form of
retributive theory. It is certainly popular ....
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 130-31 (1968).
77
 J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION Or REPEATED CRIME 8-9 (1943).
Obviously this apportionment of punishment [for attempt] can be explained only
by an assumption that to some extent it is designed for retribution. If the law's
purpose were merely preventive, it would apply to the act done the same conse-
quence, regardless of whether the act were successful or unsuccessful, since its
objective would be the prevention of acts likely to result in harm. The fact that the
punishment for success is twice as severe as the punishment for an unsuccessful
attempt must mean that the additional suffering consequent upon success is a
matter of expiation of retribution because of that success.
Id. Waite's claim that a system of punishments designed only for deterrence must impose the
same punishment for an unsuccessful attempt as for a completed crime is wrong. To see why,
apply the analysis of optimal punishment for the killing of high-value and low-value victims given
above to the case of murder (high injury—corresponding to killing a high-value victim) and
expected murder (low injury—corresponding to killing a low-value victim). Waite's point is valid,
however, if we take it as demonstrating that differential punishments for attempts, if based on
desert rather than deterrence, implies that desert is affected by consequences.
The Model Penal Code ("MPC") takes a different approach, MonEt. PENAL. CODE § 5.05(1)
(American Law Institute 1985). The MPC provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Section,
attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious
offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. An attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony of the second
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of civil and criminal cases, the sanction visited upon an offender
depends in part on things that have little or nothing to do with how
bad a person he is."
This paradox—that punishment does, and that to most people it
seems that punishment should, depend on factors unrelated to how
wicked the crime shows the perpetrator to have been—has long con-
cerned philosophers writing about both moral desert and legal pun-
ishment. Current discussions often include it in the more general
category of "Moral Luck."'" The case in favor of ignoring luck in moral
judgments was made by Immanuel Kant, who wrote:
The good will is good not because of what it causes or accom-
plishes, not because of its usefulness in the attainment of
some set purpose, but alone because of the willing, that is to
say, of itself. . . . Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add
nor detract from its worth."
Kant does not go on to apply the argument to bad will. Adam Smith,
however, made a strong argument against the moral relevance of
degree," Id. Putting aside the exception for first degree felonies, this is consistent with the idea
that punishment should depend only on intent, not outcome. Similarly, in discussing aggravating
circumstances that may justify the death penalty, the Code does not seem to include the outcome
of the crime, except insofar as it is foreseeable. See id. § 210.6. An aggravating circumstance can
be that "the murder was exceptionally heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity." Id. § 210.6(5)(h). The final requirement would seem to exclude a murder that was
especially heinous for reasons of which the murderer was unaware when he committed the crime.
See id, § 210.6(3) (g) (mitigating circumstances).
78 Stephen Shulholer has raised this issue with regard to torts as well as crimes:
Theoretically, it would be more appropriate to pay into an insurance fund a
premium based on the risks he creates in the course of his activities. Those who
stiffer injury would then seek compensation from the fund rather than impose the
entire loss on the negligent defendants who happened to cause their particular
injuries. . . . In the absence of such a framework, however, the law of torts can
properly treat those who cause harm differently from those who do not, in order
to allocate fairly the loss which has belitlien the victim. This allocation of the loss,
fortuitous as between risk-creators, is preferable to an allocation of the loss which
would be fortuitous as between faultless victims.
Stephen j. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in
the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1513 n.64 (1974). The final conclusion seems
problematic. If a driver is only liable for risk and not for result, then imposing costs upon him
beyond the amount of the risk is no more just than imposing them on another driver, or on the
victim, The fact that this seems sharply contrary to our moral intuition strikes me as evidence
against the thesis that, in determining the obligations of those who have done damage, justice
requires that we ignore consequences insofitr as they are due to events beyond the actor's control.
See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in I PROCEEDINGS or Ti.IE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIKEY 1 15-35
(Supp. vol. 1976); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 20-39 (1981).
8° IMMANUEL KANT, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE M VEA PHYSICS OF MORALS 9 (Otto
Manthey-Zorn, trans., 1938) (1785).
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luck, for good or ill. Smith argues that there are three elements to
an action: intention, action, and consequences. 8 ' All praise or blame
for the action should go to the intention. The consequence of the
action is merely luck. Smith, however, acknowledges that people
generally give blame or praise based on the consequences, rather
than the intention." Smith discusses why we feel this way, explaining
moral sentiments, not moral facts." He concludes with a consequen-
tialist argument, designed to show that our feelings, although irra-
tional, are useful, and thus evidence of the divine wisdom."
Smith's argument is that, because we can observe outcomes but
not intentions, it is sensible to base human punishments on outcomes
and leave the punishing (and rewarding) of intentions to God." It is
equivalent, in a less mathematical form, to my earlier discussion of
punishing imperfectly informed criminals. If the court had the infor-
mation that God has, it would know the ex ante probabilities facing the
criminal. By basing its punishment on that information, it could (in a
world of costly punishment) do better than if it based punishment on
actual outcome. Because courts do not have that information, they are
better off basing punishment on outcome.
For Smith, and similarly for Beccaria," this provides a moral as
well as a prudential argument for punishment according to outcome.
It is the best that human beings can do, and God will take care of
correcting the inevitable errors in both directions. For those of us who
are concerned with providing justice without divine assistance, how-
ever, the prudential argument still leaves a moral problem." Even if it
81 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL. SENTIMENTS, 175-76 (E.G. West ed., 1976) (1759).
82 Id.
83 /d. at 178-93.
84 1d. at 195.
85 One striking difference between Smith's discussion of these issues and more modern
discussions is that Smith is concerned not with the possibility that punishment by desert will
provide arguments against punishing with special severity those who (happen to have) committed
crimes with particularly heinous consequences, but with the possibility that it will provide argu-
ments for punishing those who have not committed crimes but might, under other circumstances,
have done so. He writes that, if we resented intentions as strongly as we resent actions, "Senti-
ments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of
mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the baseness of the thought which had
given birth to no action, seemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as
the baseness of the action, every court ofjudicaturc would become a real inquisition. There would
be no safety for the most innocent and circumspect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, bad designs,
might still be suspected.. . ." Id.
M CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 65-66 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963)
(1764).
117 But see Ouvtut WENIIKIJI, HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON Law 42 (1881). Holmes wrote: "On
the one side is the notion that there is a mystic bond between wrong and punishment; on the
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is prudent to use selective punishment to provide selective deterrence,
is it just to punish differently offenders who may be equally wicked,
merely because one had the good luck to miss the intended target or
to choose a less attractive victim?
Thomas Nagel discusses this problem at considerable length. 88 His
analysis, applied to the sort of situation considered here, implies not
only equal punishment for the murderer who succeeds and the mur-
derer who fails, but also equal punishment for the person who, yielding
to a particular temptation, commits murder and the person who would
have committed murder if faced by the same temptation, but had the
good luck never to be so tempted. After discussing the clash between
such conclusions and our moral intuitions, Nagel concludes:
I believe that in a sense the problem has no solution, because
something in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions
being events, or people being things. . . . Eventually nothing
remains which can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we
are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of
events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed
or praised. 89
One possible answer to these problems is that Nagel and others
are too quick to assume that what people deserve depends only on
what they are. Nagel, following Smith and Kant, takes it for granted
that differences in outcome due to factors beyond the agent's control
cannot be morally relevant. To put it differently, they take it for granted
that the answer to the question of "what ought to happen to you" can
depend only on the answer to the question "what sort of person are
you" and not on such extraneous issues as what consequences your
actions have caused.
My point here is closely related to one raised by Robert Nozick in
a different context. In discussing the problem of defining a just soci-
ety,9° he distinguished between ethics of desert and ethics of entitle-
ment. The distinction can be shown with a simple example. Suppose
we have a society in which everyone has what he or she deserves,
other, that the infliction of pain is only a means to an end. , . ." Holmes argued that the
reasonable man standard makes a less titan reasonable defendant liable even though his action
is not blameworthy. Id. at 50-51.
88
 THOMAS NAGEL, IV1oRTAL QulisTions 24-38 (1970).
59 Id. at 37.
99 Ro BERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 155-64 (1974). Nozick puts the distinction
in terms of patterned principles (of which "to each according to his moral merit" is one example)
versus entitlement principles,
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however that is correctly calculated. In this society, two people decide
to bet a dollar on a flip of a coin. The loser pays the winner. If justice
is a matter of desert, the society is now unjust. The winner did not
deserve to win—which way the coin fell was a matter utterly unrelated
to either party's moral worthiness. Because it was unrelated to moral
worth, it cannot have increased what the winner deserved by a dollar
and decreased what the loser deserved by a dollar. Yet most of us would
say that it is just for the loser to pay off the voluntarily incurred debt.
Nozick deals with this problem by the idea of entitlement—a
moral category different from desert. I am entitled to something if I
have acquired it in a morally legitimate way from someone who legiti-
mately owned it. Mutual assent, as in the case of the bet, is a morally
legitimate form of transfer, and the starting situation was, by assump-
tion, just, so the winner is entitled to the dollar. This simple example
brings up an important tension in our moral intuitions. On the one
hand, we feel as though reward and punishment ought to be deserved.
On the other hand, we feel as though certain acts create obligations
or entitlements, not because of what they tell us about the moral
worthiness of those who take them but because of their consequences.
These two approaches to moral desert are ultimately grounded in
two different ways of thinking about the moral problem. One approach
considers the problem from the viewpoint of God judging mankind.
Actual consequences are irrelevant—God can cancel them, if he
wishes, with a wave of his hand. Desert is entirely a question of how
good or bad a person is, and that is a matter that God is competent to
judge.
The other approach assumes moral judgments are to be made
within a society of equals. My opinion about how good or bad a person
you are has no special status—there is no reason to believe that it is
more accurate than anyone else's opinion, including yours. The con-
sequences of your acts, on the other hand, are there to be observed
by everyone. Thus a moral system that makes punishment and reward
depend on outcomes seems more appropriate to such a society than
one in which they depend on someone's opinion of moral merit.
Furthermore, a society of equals, unlike a society ruled by divine
providence, faces a budget constraint. If my careless driving results in
an accident that damages your car, somebody is going to have to pay
for fixing it. Bad outcomes that occur without any wicked intention
still result in costs that must. be
 paid by someone. Wicked intentions
alone, without bad consequences, do not. Again, it makes sense for the
system of moral obligations to be based on outcomes, not merely
intentions.
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We are left with two different sorts of rules. One sort allocates
punishments and rewards according to moral merit—a sort of divine
report card. The other bases them on something more like a system
of accounts. Certain acts under certain circumstances result in some
people having obligations to others—obligations that may be entirely
independent of moral merit.
While I have presented the former approach as theist and the
latter as humanist, that is a description of the pattern of the rules, not
the beliefs of those that hold them. Rules suitable to be applied by
humans may seem appropriate to a theist considering human institu-
tions. That is the position of both Smith and Beccaria. They reject
punishment by moral desert not because it is inappropriate but be-
cause it is inappropriate to human courts and should therefore be left
to divine justice. Similarly, one may believe in reward and punishment
based on moral merit even if one does not believe in the existence of
a God with the knowledge and power necessary fully to carry out such
a program.
Seen from this standpoint, the Payne dissenters' claim that
whether someone is executed should depend only on his blamewor-
thiness seems problematic. One factor relevant to punishment is how
bad particular criminals have revealed themselves to be, but an argu-
ably more important factor may be how much damage they have done.
